Usually we’re pretty, erm, forthcoming about our comings and goings with you guys here at Tectonic, but today, we’ve got a bit of an out-of-left-field one for you. We spent last week in Kyiv, Ukraine, to meet (in person) with the people at the center of the country’s defense tech industry.
We don’t need to tell you that since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian defense industry—and the operators using (and building) their technology—has changed the way we think about how wars are fought.
Rise of the drones? Ukraine-driven. Denied comms and connectivity? State of play on the frontline in Ukraine. Low-cost interceptors? Nowhere is churning them out (or updating) them faster than in Ukraine. Jamming and EW? Yep, it’s all there.
Now, of course, not all conflicts going forward will look like the war in Ukraine—the Indo-Pacific and its teeny tiny islands would, for example, (theoretically) require a whole different kind of fight.
But the lessons learned by Ukraine (and its defense industry) over nearly four years of war can help other militaries (and you defense tech lot) build and fight a bit better. So, we’re here to tell you a little bit more about what we saw.
Before we start, a note: We’re not here to issue a treatise on the future of warfare based on a few days in Kyiv. But we thought it would be helpful to share a bit about what we came away thinking about.
So, let’s jump on in.
P.S. This is the first in a two-part series, with the second part out later this week. Today’s takes will focus more on the fight itself—later this week, we’ll focus on industry.
1. Jet-powered interceptors are key, but they’re not the end-all-be-all
Now, if you live here in defense tech land, you’ve probably heard a lot of talk lately about jet-powered interceptors.
For context: Over the past couple of years, Ukraine has become pretty dang good at shooting down earlier-model Shaheds and Gerans (Iranian and Russian flagship drones) that fly at about 180-200 km/hr.
- Companies from Wild Hornets to General Cherry and Skyfall have developed pretty cheap, quick-to-build propeller-powered interceptors that can take down those slower Shaheds and Gerans for about $1,000-2,000 a pop.
- But since the beginning of the summer, Russia has been using much faster Geran 4s and 5s that can (reportedly) travel up to 500 kph. And the consensus is they’re only going to get faster. (These are the Shaheds you see getting through air defenses in places like Kyiv).
- Meanwhile, Ukraine is pretty much out of the more expensive air defense systems (like Patriots), which could (at least in theory) shoot down these systems—but for a pretty penny.
Companies across Ukraine are racing to field faster, jet-powered interceptors, but it ain’t easy, for a few reasons.
- First, it’s really hard to catch these things tail-on. Companies are figuring out ways to detonate next to them, or catch them in slower parts of their route, or even (and this is the hardest) to hit them head-on—but that requires either the world’s most skilled pilot or really good targeting software.
- Which brings us to our next point—it’s very hard to target manually at these kinds of speeds, which means you (probably) have to have a well-trained (and super-effective) last-mile targeting/lock-on system.
- Plus, it’s not just about speed. Russia is flying these new UAVs even higher (like 4-7 km), which means you’ve got to have the ability and endurance to climb into that position to even get closer to them (or you catch them when they’re descending/targeting, which is tricky business).
Then there’s the whole supply chain problem.
- Ukraine was already experiencing a mini turbojet crunch in the spring—that’s only gotten worse. The issue is, there are only a few Western manufacturers (including PBS Group in Czechia, JetCat in Germany, and Destinus in the Netherlands) that can churn these out at scale. And if you use Chinese engines, well, they’re Chinese—and there is a backlog on those too.
- Plus, they’re a lot more expensive. Yes, faster Gerans are also pricier, but jet-powered interceptors have a lot worse economics on them than those $1-2K interceptors. Pressure’s on to, well, hit the target.
However, several companies we spoke to said they were very close to fielding jet-powered interceptors that could take down these new threats—like, within the next few months close.
- But the concern many executives and operators shared is that the Gerans/Shaheds are only going to get faster—it’s a bit of a death-spiral cat-and-mouse game. Basically, the minute they’ve got a jet-powered interceptor that can hit the current models, Russia will already be flying something faster.
- It’s a physics problem combined with an economics problem combined with a supply chain problem. In other words: Thorny.
Which brings us to our next point.
2. The vibe is: Get to the source
It’s no secret that Ukraine has probably pissed off some Russians (or, certainly, Russian oil execs) with its deep strike campaign this summer. But many of the executives and operators we spoke with argued that this should go further.
- The idea is that if you can’t (at least for now) hit these faster drones with a high degree of accuracy, you should aim for where they’re launched from and produced.
- That means pushing the fight further upstream: launch sites, storage facilities, production plants, and the infrastructure that keeps Russia’s drone campaign running.
- And that, in turn, puts even more emphasis on mid- and deep strike. Ukraine has gotten very, very good at building long-range one-way attack drones—but the next push is toward systems that are faster, harder to intercept, carry more punch, and can reliably reach targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away.
That goes for bigger threats—like ballistic missiles—as well.
- Ukrainian intelligence has indicated that Russia is building up a mega ballistic missile stockpile (Iskanders, Kinzhals, and North Korean missiles) for the winter. That’s the threat that most people we spoke to were most worried about.
- That means that Ukraine needs higher-end interceptors—like the PAC-3—to take them down. But despite all the diplomacy, it’s unclear when those Western systems will make their way to the country in meaningful numbers.
- Fire Point—the company behind a lot of this summer’s deep strikes, plus a mega pink-themed marketing campaign—estimates that their FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles will be fielded by the end of the year. While those aren’t (at least technically) interceptors, Fire Point seems to be angling FP-7 towards missile defense.
In lieu of these air defenses, the big push—at least from the people we spoke to—is to hit harder and heavier into Russia and its defense base to make it more painful for the war to continue at its current pace.
3. But it’s not just about the big stuff
On the frontlines—and, especially, in the 30-40 kilometer “kill zone”—small drones still account for the vast majority of deaths (like 60-70 percent), and DJI-made drones (especially Mavics) still terrorize troops and give Russia a mega-view of the battlefield.
- Ukraine still needs effective systems—especially non-Chinese systems—that can both mirror and counter these threats. Companies like Vyriy and TAF are working to churn these out at scale.
- But there still isn’t a silver bullet. One Khartiia Corps operator described countering Mavic-type drones as “one of the most difficult things we are struggling [with] for years, and we are not solving.”
- He went further: “Once you have the Mavics, you have the perfect vision of the front line, and you can target everything.”
- The same goes for fiber-optic drones—there still isn’t a perfect, one-size-fits-all solution to small drones that can do ISR (and attack) on the frontline and not get jammed (or have their cable snipped).
In other words—while the industry is racing towards higher-end deep and mid strike systems and jet-powered interceptors, operators still need the smaller, cheaper systems that can help them counter the (mostly Chinese) stuff the Russians are using.
- This is why, Vyriy CEO Oleksii Babenko told us, his company is still putting a lot of effort into building something like the Slavic (their version of a Mavic).
- TAF, General Cherry, and Skyfall, among others, are all still churning out oodles of small drones, as well.
Speaking of Chinese parts, a note: While most of the companies we spoke to were working to get Chinese parts out of their supply chain, especially for export (we’ll get to that more in part two), most did say they’re still willing to use the Chinese stuff if it gets kit (especially one-way kit) to the frontline faster.
As the Wild Hornets executive told us, “We try to have at least two options for every part…sometimes some of these parts we can even get in Ukraine from Ukrainian [producers], but sometimes the Chinese are just faster.”
4. In case you forgot, logistics win wars, dummy
On the whole “hit ‘em where it hurts” topic, many leaders and operators emphasized the need to cut Russian supply lines to the front. That’s a mid-strike problem.
- Don’t kill 50,000 drones; kill what’s bringing them there. Vyriy’s Babenko put the logic pretty simply: “We cannot destroy 15,000 or 50,000 FPV drones on the front line,” but you can target the relatively small number of vehicles bringing those drones forward. In other words, go after the supply chain instead of playing whack-a-mole with every system it produces.
- That makes mid-strike increasingly important. Khartiia told us it was focusing heavily on mid-strike precisely because it can sever the supply links feeding Russian forces—and potentially stop a breakthrough before it reaches the front.
The same logic also applies on the Ukrainian side—and is why companies (and the MoD) are pushing for the “kill zone” to be pretty much solely populated by robots.
- Ukraine’s MoD has said it wants more than 25,000 UGVs for exactly this reason, and wants to transition frontline logistics entirely to unmanned systems.
- Roman Tkachenko, co-founder and CBDO of UGV company Tencore, told us that “the majority of [their] missions and the primary use case today is logistics.” Ground robots can move ammunition, food, batteries, and medical supplies through areas where sending a person or truck is increasingly dangerous. They can also do CASEVACs.
- By sending out swarms of small robots (rather than single, expensive vehicles), they also make it trickier to cut an entire supply line with one strike.
This also applies (somewhat) to the issue of holding territory. Russia has the “meat grinder” of recruits that can be bussed in to hold areas they’ve seized. Ukraine does not have the same masses of manpower, and drones aren’t quite as good at holding ground.
- But if you have masses of robots, you can keep the units holding territory at the front supplied and (somewhat) protected.
5. If you can’t defend, attack and adapt
Most of the folks we spoke to seemed pretty clear-eyed about how, well, shit the winter is going to be. The expectation is that Russia is going to pound the whole country (but especially major cities, including Kyiv) with missiles and super-fast drones.
- Most expect that the Kremlin will target critical infrastructure in particular—energy, water, and the like. Especially without exquisite interceptors, that is going to make for a brutal six months.
If you can’t defend against all of this—and, to quote Perry Boyle of MITS Capital, “There aren’t enough interceptors in the world to defend against what Russia is sending at Ukraine”—you’ve got to find ways to protect what you’ve got. That’s taking a few different forms.
- Going underground: There is a super, mega-push to put defense production and critical infrastructure underground in Ukraine right now. Ukraine’s MoD has described it as the country’s “Underground Defence Industry,” and is basically seeking out private capital and industry cooperation to take things subterranean.
- Distributing everything: Here in Europe and the US, we love to talk about vertical integration, everything in one place, etc. In Ukraine, people are thinking the opposite—companies are distributing their production lines and supply chains so that if one thing gets hit, the whole system doesn’t go down. Boards in one place, airframes in another, and propulsion in yet another. Like, the opposite of what Ford was going for.
- Keeping up the offensive: As we said above, everyone we spoke to was basically, like, you can’t just push back what Russia is doing. Do the same thing they’re doing—attack the supply lines, the launchers, the critical infrastructure. As Boyle said, the goal is “taking out the missiles before they leave the factory.”
- Securing multiple supply chains: Most companies we spoke to said they have multiple sources for every single part that goes into their platforms
6. Autonomy is squishier than we’re led to believe
Everyone loves to talk about autonomy. But in Ukraine, the reality is less “robot take the wheel,” and more “robot help out on the harder parts of the task.” A few takeaways:
- Autonomous doesn’t mean human-free. Norda Dynamics CEO Nazar Bigun described the stack his company is building as “autonomy where the pilot is in the loop”—the drone does the work, while the operator watches and can intervene.
- Right now, it’s more about making operators’ jobs easier. Autonomy can handle flying, driving, navigation, target lock, or terminal guidance, reducing the skill and attention required from the person behind the screen. But we found few cases of “press a button, and you’re done.”
- And humans are still very much involved. As a Wild Hornets executive put it: “[Software] can help the pilot. But anyway, the pilot should be involved.” Their interceptors, even the fast ones, it’s worth noting, are still remote-controlled.
- Speaking of remote controlled/operated—that’s still the standard, especially for smaller systems. “Autonomy” is more the extra-lethal cherry on top—it helps keep things going, identify targets, and, in some cases, strike them.
7. Comms, comms, comms
Almost everyone we spoke to brought up some version of the same problem: None of this fancy stuff works particularly well if you can’t talk to it.
- And the battlefield is really, really hostile to comms. EW, jamming, spoofing, terrain, range, and plain old physics are constantly screwing with links.
- Even Starlink isn’t a perfect solution. Most companies (especially those building bigger platforms) use Starlink today, but are seeking other solutions. Starlink, for example, doesn’t work within Russian territory, so it can’t be used for deep strike (most operators we spoke to said opening this up would be a game changer). Also, it’s pretty nerve-wracking to have all of your connectivity in the hands of one company.
So, Ukraine is trying to build around that problem.
- Companies like Himera and Sine are developing communications systems, tactical radios, mesh networks, and other connectivity solutions that are designed to keep units (and platforms, even the unmanned ones) connected when things are super jammy or degraded.
- The assumption now is that you’ll be pretty jammed in-theater. So, if your kit doesn’t work under heavy EW—that’s a no-go. Tencore, for example, is building its UGVs so that they can keep moving even if they lose connectivity, and nearly all of the UXV companies we spoke to said their platforms are built to frequency hop and be jamming-resistant.
- As TAF Industries CEO Volodymyr Zinovskyi put it: “The main challenge now is about the communication systems.” And let’s remember, this guy is building drones.
Basically: autonomy, swarms, UGVs, long-range strike—all great. But the increasingly important question is what the hell they do when the signal disappears.
8. And our last point for today—Ukraine’s biggest edge is its feedback loop
Everyone likes to say that their stuff is battle-tested in Ukraine.
But, according to a lot of the people we spoke to in Kyiv, building something that actually makes a difference isn’t necessarily about how shiny it is, or whether it flew on a range once—it’s about whether it’s actually meeting a real operator need.
- That means getting very, very close to the operators. TAF’s Zinovskyi told us it starts by asking the military “what they really need,” rather than building around what engineers think the battlefield needs. That’s, like, the most important first step.
- Then, do it a million times more. Systems need to go to the front en masse, operators find out what works (and, importantly, what doesn’t), that feedback gets pushed back to the engineers, and the next iteration goes out. Fast.
- That’s the actual edge. As Fourthlaw CEO Yaroslav Azhnyuk put it, “Battle-tested in Ukraine stands for nothing.” The real advantage, he argued, is the “productized feedback loop.”
- And soldiers are basically part of the engineering team for a lot of these companies. Tencore’s Tkachenko told us much of what it has built exists because of its users: “They are part of our R&D team and our company.”
In other words, Ukraine hasn’t made it this far just because it’s building the newest, most cutting-edge kit—it’s just as much about building and adapting based on what the military actually wants and needs in any given moment.
What doesn’t work, most emphasized, is sending a few drones to the front without the feedback and development loop. That’s how you get an, erm, tainted reputation.
More on that later this week. Stay tuned for part two.
